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Abstract: This paper examines the broad range of informal land transactions and 
arrangements migrants are entering into with customary landowners to gain access to 
customary land for export cash cropping in the oil palm belt of West New Britain, Papua 
New Guinea. Whilst these arrangements can provide migrants with relatively secure access to 
land, there are instances of migrants losing their land rights. Typically, the land tenure 
arrangements of migrants with more secure access to land are within a framework of property 
rights for social inclusion whereby customary landowners’ inalienable rights to land are 
preserved and the ‘outsider’ becomes an ‘insider’ with ongoing use rights to the land. 
Through socially embedding land transactions in place-based practices of nonmarket 
exchange, identities of difference are eroded as migrants assume identities as part of their 
host groups. This adaptability of customary land tenure and its capacity to accommodate 
large migration in-flows and expanding commodity production undermines the argument 
common amongst proponents of land reform that customary tenure is static and inflexible. 
Before such claims are heeded, there must be more detailed empirical investigations of the 
diverse range of land tenure regimes operating in areas of the country experiencing high rates 
of immigration. 
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This paper is concerned with the migration and settlement of large numbers of migrants 
seeking access to customary land1 for oil palm production and other livelihood activities in 
the oil palm belt of West New Britain Province (WNB), Papua New Guinea (PNG). The 
paper addresses two questions that are under-explored in the research on rural migration in 
the region. First, how do migrants as ‘outsiders’ without customary land-use rights obtain 
access to land to establish new livelihoods in their adopted homes? Second, how are 
customary land tenure arrangements being modified in response to the growing demand for 
land by ‘outsiders’ for agricultural development? 
 
These questions are relevant to other rural areas of the developing world experiencing large 
in-flows of migrants seeking land. Across the developing world, people are leading more 
mobile lives as they migrate further afield and in larger numbers to seek new livelihood 
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opportunities and experiences (Rigg, 2007). While much of this migration is rural-to-urban, a 
sizable proportion is rural-to-rural, particularly to agricultural and resource frontier zones. To 
provide this broader context and comparative material for the PNG case study, the paper 
begins with a brief overview of informal land markets in rural Southeast Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa where large numbers of migrants are acquiring land for cash crop production, 
creating burgeoning informal land markets. This overview is followed by the PNG case 
study, beginning with an analysis of the main types of short and long-term land-use 
agreements negotiated between land-poor migrants and customary landowners in WNB. 
While these tenure arrangements can provide migrants with continuing and relatively secure 
access to customary land, there are many instances of migrants losing access rights to the 
land. 
 
To understand why some migrants can successfully gain ongoing use rights to land while 
others continue to have insecure use rights, the paper draws on and extends Robert Cooter’s 
(1991a) conceptual framework of land ownership in PNG which contrasts two types of 
ownership: ‘property law for stranger relations’ and ‘property law for kin relations’. 
Customary landowners, while superficially engaging in a process of commodifying land 
through ‘sales’2 and ‘rentals’ to migrants, are striving to socially embed land transactions by 
expecting migrants to maintain certain social and economic relationships with them as host 
lineages. For their validity, these relationships draw on place-based frameworks of land 
tenure in which social relations grounded in non-market exchange practices play a pivotal 
role in legitimising access rights. This process we term ‘property rights for social inclusion’ 
for it opens up opportunities for migrants to become a subgroup of the landowning group (to 
become insiders) which serves to erode identities of difference and bestow on migrants 
temporary or long-term access rights to land. Towards the end of the paper, we examine the 
extent to which these seemingly new types of land tenure arrangements emerging in rural 
WNB, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, where there is high demand for land by 
outsiders, are modelled on old practices, customs and power relations. The paper closes with 
a brief discussion of the implications of the findings for recently mooted policies of land 
tenure reform in PNG. 
 
 
Migrants and informal rural land markets in 
the Global South 
 
Several scholars working in Indonesia have documented the sale of land to spontaneous 
migrants seeking land for cash crop production (e.g. Ruf and Yoddang, 1999; Elmhirst, 2001; 
Li, 2002; Potter and Badcock, 2004). In Central Sulawesi, Li (2002) charted the impact of the 
cocoa boom in the Lauje area in the early 1990s. Land was effectively privatised as a 
consequence of the cocoa boom because permanent tree crops broke the swidden cycle 
underpinning communal inheritance. This provided the basis for land to be treated as a 
commodity that could then be sold to migrants moving into the area. 
 
In another case study from the Lindu area of Central Sulawesi where large concentrations of 
Bugis migrants have settled recently, Li reported that the indigenous population sold much of 
the land ‘before they recognised its greatly enhanced value’ (2002: 426). Why customary 
landowners would sell so much of their land to their own disadvantage is explained by Li as 
an indirect result of the uncertain legal status of customary land which enabled village 





apply various ‘rules’ which purportedly limit the validity of customary claims. They tell 
villagers that their customary rights lapse if the land has not been used for five years, or if 
the area exceeds 2 hectares, or if no tree-crops have been planted, or if the land has not 
been registered with the headman, or taxed, or issued with a certificate (Li, 2002: 428). 
 
To receive some financial benefit before the land was sold off by the village headmen, 
villagers themselves began selling customary land to outsiders. 
 
In a similar case from Sulawesi, Potter and Badcock (2004) described the loss of former 
customary swidden lands in the Rokan Hulu District, Riau Province, where, since the mid-
1980s, migrants had been purchasing land from customary landowners. Despite land sales 
being contrary to adat, most sales were legitimised through land ownership letters/certificates 
with the agreement of village officials and adat leaders. Approximately one-third of village 
land was purchased by outsiders, leaving villagers with insufficient land to practice 
‘traditional’ farming. Much of the land sold to migrants was planted with oil palm and, to a 
lesser extent, with rice and rubber. Concern over the sale of agricultural land to migrants was 
also raised by Elmhirst (2001) working in the North Lampung transmigration resettlement 
areas of Sulawesi. The transmigration scheme introduced new farming systems and created 
an active land market as spontaneous migrants moved into the area and bought land either 
from transmigrants or local landowners. With the pressure on land for agricultural 
development, land values rose dramatically and speculative land dealings were on the 
increase. 
 
Several themes are common to each of the Sulawesi case studies regarding the sale of land to 
migrants. These include the undermining and manipulation of the principles governing 
customary land tenure, emerging land shortages, the semi-formalisation of land transfers and 
the growing commodification of land. A comparable situation, though not to the same level 
of dispossession as reported in some of the Indonesian case-studies, has been documented in 
sub-Saharan Africa where the sale of agricultural land to migrants is occurring in many rural 
areas despite traditional prohibitions on the sale of customary land (e.g. Amanor and 
Diderutuah, 2001; Sjaastad, 2003; Daley, 2005; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Hagberg, 
2006; Peters, 2007; Yeboah, 2008).3 
 
As in Indonesia, many rural land sales to migrants in sub-Saharan Africa are for the 
establishment of export cash crops and occur in the absence of formal land markets. Because 
such land transactions are not strictly in accordance with ‘traditional’ customary land laws, 
new rules and procedures have evolved to legitimise them and give them local validity, and 
evidence suggests that many remain embedded in the social relations and obligations 
underpinning ‘traditional’ land rights (Mathieu et al., 2002; Chauveau, 2006; Chimhowu and 
Woodhouse, 2006).4 Many land transactions often combine local cultural circumstances and 
mimic more legal processes operating in formal land markets. For example, Mathieu and 
colleagues (2002) noted informal land sales in Burkina Faso where the transfer of land was 
recorded on a written document signed by a local official, but without the words ‘sell’ or 
‘buy’ mentioned because the sale of customary land is illegal in state law. In another 
example, Daley (2005) observed in her Tanzanian study that payments by the seller and 
purchaser to a village land committee to ‘register’ land transactions were, while technically 
illegal, tolerated because of their ‘reference to the long-standing tradition in Uhehe that 
political leaders and land-allocating authorities were paid with “gifts” for their duties’ (2005: 
553). Similarly, Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006) presented examples from West Africa of 
individuals strengthening the legitimacy of their purchases through investing in land 
4 
 
improvements (e.g. tree planting, irrigation, continual use of land) – ‘traditional’ practices 
consistent with securing rights to customary land. 
 
The sub-Saharan African material reveals the adaptability and malleability of customary land 
tenure in areas receiving large numbers of migrants. Furthermore, it indicates that the process 
of commodification does not necessarily involve a radical break with principles of customary 
land tenure, but rather a more evolutionary process of change in which both indigenous 
(informal) and introduced (formal) principles of land tenure are drawn upon to develop new 
land tenure arrangements and procedures to accommodate outsiders seeking land for 
agricultural development. However, as some of the Southeast Asian and African case studies 
reveal, there are inherent risks for customary landowners when village and political elites are 
able to manipulate principles of customary tenure to the disadvantage of ordinary villagers. 
 
 
West New Britain: From cocoa and copra to oil palm 
 
The oil palm belt on the northern coastal plain of WNB extends from Willaumez Peninsula to 
Open Bay near the East New Britain provincial border (Fig. 1). Most residents of the belt are 
heavily reliant on local resources for their everyday survival, especially land for gardening 
and commercial agriculture and, to a lesser extent, marine resources. Subsistence activities 
remain the cornerstone of village life where people rely on agriculture to meet most of their 
daily food requirements. Increasingly, terrestrial and marine resources are being used to 
generate cash incomes as people’s material aspirations rise and cash becomes ever more 
important for meeting everyday needs. 
 
Villagers have diverse livelihoods with many holding a range of export cash crops, including 
oil palm, cocoa and copra (Koczberski and Curry, 2003; Koczberski and Curry, 2005; 
Koczberski et al., 2006). Cocoa and copra were the first export cash crops to be planted by 
villagers and, until recently, they provided an important income source for rural households. 
Over the past decade, however, smallholder production of these crops has declined 
considerably because of declining market access which has compelled many villagers to 
diversify income sources. Many villagers turned to oil palm. Presently, the oil palm industry 
dominates the rural economy and is by far the most important commodity crop for 
smallholders and a major employer in the province. On several socioeconomic indicators, the 
oil palm growing areas in WNB rank highly relative to other rural areas of PNG (Hanson et 
al., 2001). 
 
Over 77 000 hectares of land are planted with oil palm in the two oil palm growing areas of 
Hoskins and Bialla (Table 1). Commercial plantings in the province began at Hoskins in the 
late 1960s following a World Bank recommendation that oil palm on a nucleus estate 
smallholder model be introduced to WNB to diversify the agricultural economy and increase 
the export income of PNG. The recommendation accorded at the time with the Australian 
administration’s land settlement policies of the 1950s and 1960s to open up ‘un-used’ or 
‘under-exploited’ land for the voluntary resettlement of rural people for the primary purpose 
of cash crop production. As part of these policies, large tracts of customary land along the 
north coast were alienated by the State and later used to develop the nucleus estate-





Figure 1. Location map of West New Britain Province 
 
 
Table 1.  Oil Palm Statistics for 2004-2005 for Hoskins and Bialla 
Oil Palm Statistics  Hoskins Bialla Totals 
Smallholder production 
(FFB tonnes) 
286 145 134 700 420 845 
Smallholder area (Ha)* 24 064 12 026 36 090 
Plantation production 
(FFB tonnes) 
616 135** 144 948*** 761 083 
Plantation area (Ha)** 30 447** 10 929*** 41 376 
* 2005/06 Figures supplied by OPIC.  **Mini-estates included in plantation statistics.  ***Community 
Oil Palm Estate Development (COPED) included in plantation statistics. 
 
The nucleus estate-smallholder model allowed for the establishment of smallholder land 
settlement schemes (LSSs), initially at Hoskins in 1968 and at Bialla in 1972. Settlers were 
recruited for the LSSs from other provinces of PNG and acquired individual 99-year state 
agricultural leases over blocks ranging from 4 to 6.5 hectares. Agricultural leases were 
publicly advertised with priority given to applicants from land-short areas of the country 
(Hulme, 1984; Curry and Koczberski, 1998). As the industry expanded, villagers living on 
customary land surrounding the nucleus estates were encouraged to plant two-hectare plots of 
oil palm as part of the Village Oil Palm (VOP) scheme. Planting by customary landowners 




The pull of prosperity 
The relative prosperity of the oil palm economy is the basis for the high population growth 
rate in the region. Between 1980 and 2000, WNB’s annual population growth of 3.7% was 
among the highest in the country (National Statistical Office, 2001) due to both in-migration 
and a total fertility rate of over six. At the 2000 census, 30.5% of the WNB population were 
migrants (National Statistics Office, 2001). 
 
The large migrant population is concentrated in the Hoskins and Bialla oil palm LSSs and in 
the urban centres of Kimbe and Bialla. The LSSs have experienced considerable population 
growth since the late 1960s/early 1970s. Population density on the Hoskins LSS has risen 
from 5.9 persons per block in the early 1970s (Ploeg, 1972) to 13.3 persons per block (222 
persons/km2) in 2000, and in 2002 the Bialla LSS averaged 11.1 persons per block (185 
persons/km2). The oil palm belt also attracts many migrants from less well-off areas of the 
province and other regions of PNG who take up residence in informal urban settlements, on 
plantation compounds or with relatives on the LSSs. Excluding the highly densely populated 
islands of Bali Witu and Arawe, the oil palm belt from the Willaumez Peninsula to Navo has 
the highest population densities in the province, at up to 130 persons/km2 (Hanson et al., 
2001). Talasea Census District, which covers most of the oil palm belt, has a migrant 
population of 38% of the total population, the large majority of whom (79%) have migrated 
from other provinces (National Statistical Office, 2001). Thus, a sizable proportion of the 
rural population in the oil palm belt do not have birth rights to land.5 
 
 
Changing land tenure arrangements 
 
Economic and demographic changes have been accompanied by marked alterations in land 
tenure. Aside from the alienated land under state agricultural leases described above, a wide 
range of overlapping tenure regimes/arrangements has emerged – informal, legal and illegal. 
While most village lands designated for oil palm cultivation are allocated by clan leaders and 
subject to the regulations of customary land tenure principles, the long-term cultivation of 
perennial cash crops can induce de facto changes in land tenure regimes. Usufruct rights are 
increasingly being vested in the same family or individuals for extended periods (smallholder 
oil palm is replanted at between 20 and 25 years of age), leading some villagers to claim 
exclusive rights of access to, and inheritance of, these resources.6 In effect, land rights are 
being ‘individualised’ as land is excised from the communal pool of clan land that is 
governed by communal tenure and matrilineal principles of inheritance. 
 
As customary land tenure is modified, people’s views and attitudes to land are changing such 
that land is increasingly being viewed by some clan members as a commodity that can be 
leased to oil palm milling companies,7 or informally ‘sold’8 or ‘rented’ to people outside the 
land-holding group. A discussion of these informal land ‘sales’ and ‘rentals’ is next. 
 
Settlers seeking land 
There is a large demand for land by migrants desiring to secure a future for their families in 
the WNB oil palm belt. There are few opportunities to purchase freehold land in the Bialla 
and Hoskins regions. While there has been a long history of customary landowners in the area 
gifting land to non-clan members, the informal ‘sale’ or ‘renting’ of land to migrants from 
other provinces in PNG is more recent. The ‘sale’ of customary land to migrants, in particular 





Most migrants ‘purchasing’ customary land wish to plant oil palm. They are usually the 
children or relatives of the original oil palm LSS leaseholders who migrated to WNB in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, or are those in long-term employment (especially as oil palm 
plantation and mill labourers). On highly populated LSS blocks, many of the married sons of 
the original settlers are seeking land of their own to plant oil palm and raise their families. 
However, most second and third generation settlers are being squeezed out of the market for 
LSS blocks by rising prices and limited opportunities to accumulate savings on highly 
populated LSS blocks. Increasingly, those purchasing LSS blocks are urban-based 
professionals, successful businessmen, senior managers employed by the plantation 
companies, and occasionally, political elites. The current price of an LSS block at Bialla and 
Hoskins ranges from K5000 to K10 000 per hectare (K30 000 to K60 000 for a six-hectare 
block) compared with K500 to K3000 per hectare for customary land (K2.5 = Aus$1.00, The 
Australian 21–22 July, 2007). Further, because opportunities for returning ‘home’ to settle 
are becoming more constrained through time, second generation settlers’ attempts to secure 
additional land in WNB are becoming more urgent. Opportunities to re-establish themselves 
at ‘home’ are becoming remote because of their long absences, together with the fact that 
many of their children were raised in WNB and learned Melanesian Pidgin rather than their 
parents’ home languages (Curry and Koczberski, 1999). Their home areas are also likely to 
be experiencing population and land pressures because settlers were initially recruited from 
land-short areas. Similarly, company employees who have spent much of their working lives 
in WNB and who identify more closely with WNB than ‘home’ (their children were raised in 
WNB), aspire to securing a livelihood in ‘retirement’ by purchasing land. Thus, for the 
majority of second generation settlers and migrant workers, the purchase of customary land in 
WNB is their only real option, apart from illegally occupying rural State land or moving into 
an informal settlement in town. 
 
Within the oil palm schemes of Bialla and Hoskins, approximately 200 hectares and 2721 
hectares of customary land respectively have been ‘sold’ to ‘outsiders’ for oil palm 
development, typically as two- or four-hectare blocks. The planting of oil palm by migrants 
on ‘purchased’ customary land has expanded markedly over the past 10 years, with 
approximately 23% of the total area of oil palm established on customary land in the Hoskins 
area now ‘owned’ by outsiders. While there are formal procedures for the sale or transfer of 
customary land, in almost all cases, land transactions are organised informally.9 Hence, there 
is great variation in the types of informal land sale agreements which is partly explained by 
the different types of relationships between ‘vendors’ and ‘purchasers’ (see below). Most 
‘sales’ are verbal agreements without documentary evidence of the clan’s approval of the 
land transaction nor any written record of the agreed sale price, size and boundary of the 
parcel of land sold or deposit paid: most transactions involve an initial deposit followed by 
payment instalments that may be spread over several years while the ‘purchaser’ resides on 
the land. Many migrants view the ‘purchase’ of land as conferring ownership in perpetuity 
which will allow their children to inherit the land. This is not the case in law as the land 
remains customary land with the potential for the block to be reclaimed by the customary 
landowners on the death of the ‘purchaser’ (Curry et al., 2007). 
 
Indeed, there have been numerous cases of migrants being evicted or harassed by members of 
the landowning group, especially by younger clan members, and instances where the land 
‘purchased’ by migrants has been reclaimed by the customary landowners (Koczberski and 
Curry, 2004; Curry and Koczberski, 2009). In May 2006, the District Court in Kimbe ruled in 
favour of a landowning group for the return of land illegally ‘sold’ to migrants by an 
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individual from a neighbouring landowner group (J. Warku, pers. comm., 2000). Over 100 
migrant families face eviction from the land they had ‘purchased’ and planted to oil palm. 
That some migrants are willing to pursue the risky strategy of acquiring customary land is 
indicative of the social and economic pressures on second generation leasehold migrants and 
plantation/mill labourers, and the limited economic futures they would face if they were to 
return to their home provinces.10 
 
The least financially risky option for land-poor migrants is to informally ‘rent’ land from 
customary landowners. Typically, migrants ‘rent’ a small plot of land for a house site in a 
small community of migrants to whom they are usually related, and an additional nearby 
small plot of land for garden food production. These settlements are on customary land or 
state land,11 and are usually less than two to three hectares. Many of these migrants 
informally ‘renting’ land from the customary landowners have previously worked as oil palm 
labourers and many of them have relatives living on the LSSs, company residential 
compounds or on ‘purchased’ land. The numbers of residents and erected houses in the 
settlement, and the size and locations of food gardens are monitored and controlled by the 
customary landowners. 
 
The term ‘rent’ is used here to define a set of highly variable informal arrangements between 
landowners and migrants that provide migrants with temporary and tightly defined access 
rights to the customary land of their hosts. Both parties are clearly aware that the ‘rental’ 
agreement is a temporary arrangement (though some have been in place for over 20 years), 
and that the underlying ownership of the host lineage is not undermined through occupancy 
and use. These ‘rental’ agreements are typically based on indigenous exchange relationships, 
whereby migrants gain occupancy rights and the right to erect semi-permanent houses, 
cultivate food gardens and, occasionally, in special circumstances, to plant permanent cash 
crops in return for a ‘rental’ payment in the form of cash, labour, garden foods and/or 
participation in communal events. The size and frequency of payments of cash, labour and 
food items vary greatly between settlements, between households within settlements and 
through time, and are often dictated by the needs of the host lineages at particular points in 
time, and the landowner’s relationship with the head of the settlement. For example, it is not 
unusual for landowners to visit settlements to raise money for large customary events such as 
mortuary or brideprice payments. 
 
Different sets of rules apply to ‘rented’ land used for commercial purposes. As mentioned 
above, the planting of permanent cash crops is rarely permitted and occurs only when there is 
a strong and long-term friendship between migrant and host, or the migrant is related to the 
host (e.g. as an in-law). Generally, migrants ‘renting’ land are precluded from building up a 
permanent claim of ownership to the land by being denied rights to plant perennial cash crops 
and coconut palms. Other income generating activities such as commercial peanut production 
(a cash crop sold at local markets), vanilla cultivation, or the establishment of small 
businesses such as tradestores or poultry production and sales are generally prohibited. If 
these income-generating activities are permitted, it is expected that the income from these 
businesses will be shared with the landowners or that other obligations to the hosts are 
fulfilled. In one informal settlement on state land near Bialla town, occupied by migrants 
from Southern Highlands Province, the original customary landowners of the land were 
illegally collecting monthly ‘rents’ on two poultry businesses and one tradestore in the 
settlement. According to the tradestore proprietor, the hefty rental fees on the tradestore 
significantly eroded his profits on the business, and after 12 months of operation the store 
closed. In a nearby informal settlement on ‘rented’ customary land, one of the customary 
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landowners had recently approached the East Sepik migrants leasing the land with an offer of 
two hectares of land which they could use to cultivate peanut gardens for two years. The 
landowner asked the residents to do the laborious tasks of clearing the secondary forest on the 
land and planting his oil palm seedlings. In return, they could interplant the oil palm 
seedlings with peanuts for sale at local markets. In this case, the landowner benefited from 
the access to in-kind labour to clear and plant the site to oil palm, as well as two years of 
additional labour to weed the site during the establishment phase of the oil palm. For the 
migrants, there were potentially high incomes to be earned from cultivating and marketing 
the peanuts. 
 
Thus, the basic and typical land-use rights extended to migrants through informal ‘rental’ 
agreements permit the temporary occupation of land, the erection of houses and the 
cultivation of food gardens, with wealth generating activities on the land more strictly 
controlled. In some situations, these small settlements on ‘rented’ land can become closely 
aligned with a particular segment of the host community such as the lineage or subclan of the 
clan leader who provided initial access to the land. The settlement community can therefore 
become an important support base for village leaders or aspiring leaders. These small 
settlements allow these leaders in the host community to advance their social and political 
position by providing them with political support and a source of labour, cash and wealth 
items to be deployed through indigenous exchange networks to enhance their status and 
position. In the longer-term, they provide a possibility for the ‘privatisation’ or 
‘individualisation’ of communal resources. 
 
 
Insiders/outsiders and property rights for social inclusion 
 
Customary land purchases sometimes end in dispute after a few years. Ownership disputes 
arise from two conflicting interpretations of land transactions: an introduced view of land as a 
commodity with exclusive and alienable rights over a defined area of land; and an indigenous 
view of land as an inalienable resource held by the kinship group, and where a range of use 
rights to separate resources may be held simultaneously by different people and groups. 
Many settlers and other outsiders seeking to acquire customary land approach the transaction 
as if it were largely a market transaction involving the purchase of exclusive and alienable 
rights to the land. Accordingly, the transaction is interpreted by the migrant as conferring on 
him individual ownership similar to freehold title. 
 
The second perspective – the indigenous view of land as an inalienable resource held by the 
kinship group – is common among members of the customary landowning group. In this 
view, exclusive and permanent property rights are not guaranteed by full payment of the 
agreed ‘purchase’ price. Instead of land rights being permanent and exclusive, a less 
exclusive set of rights pertain that are conditional for their ongoing validity on continued 
participation in customary exchange activities and fulfilling other obligations to their hosts. 
Accordingly, they are expected to share a portion of their wealth with the landowning group 
by contributing to bride wealth, mortuary payments and to other forms of indigenous 
exchange in which their host lineages are involved. Involvement in community events is also 
expected. When participation in exchange activities with host lineages ceases, the validity of 





Robert Cooter’s (1991a) conceptualisation of the differences between freehold and customary 
tenure in PNG (Fig. 2) can be usefully applied to the two different interpretations of land 
transactions described above. Cooter described freehold transactions as those that occur 
largely between strangers whose only relationship with each other is commercial and the 
obligations and commitments to each other are minimal. While buyers and sellers have some 
obligations to each other, based on moral norms of societal behaviour, the transaction choices 
they make are not constrained by social obligations to each other. Both parties can act to their 
own best advantage and the relationship between them is short-term and concludes with 
completion of the sale. Freehold tenure is thus conceived as ‘property law for stranger 
relations’ (Cooter, 1991a: 41). In contrast, customary land tenure transactions occur between 
relatives and are based on long-term relationships of reciprocal obligations, cooperation and 
commitment to members of the kinship group (Fig. 2). Such obligations and commitments 
affect customary rights to land and constrain a person’s freedom to act to their own best 
advantage in land transactions. Cooter (1991a: 41) describes customary land law as ‘property 
law for kin relations’. Under customary land law, the concept of property is relational and 
ownership rights are dispersed among the kinship group. This is in contrast to freehold title 





Figure 2.  Cooter’s concept of property law in PNG 
 
 
Many settlers purchasing land are attempting to discursively construct the land transaction as 
being in the realm of commodity exchange thereby associating the transaction with principles 
of freehold title (stranger relations). They attempt to limit their relationships with landowners, 
and are also more likely to experience challenges to their tenure and harassment by local 
youth. For the outsider acquiring land there are several advantages if the transaction is 
understood by the customary landowners as a market transaction in which the land parcel, as 
a commodity, has been alienated from customary ownership. From this perspective, the land 
is held in perpetuity by the purchaser and is therefore able to be inherited by his children on 
his death. He has absolute control over the land including land use (any income activity does 
not lead to claims by the customary landowners for a share of that wealth), disposal of land 
(the land can be sold or leased to someone else), and there are no obligations on him to 
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maintain a social relationship with his ‘hosts’ through gifts of labour and wealth. All 
obligations cease with the final payment instalment for the land. It is possible that clan 
leaders eager to sell land encouraged this perception among migrants purchasing land. 
Likewise, it is possible that this view is derived from migrants’ experiences of living on 
government leasehold LSSs where they have had no social or financial obligations to the 
former customary landowners. It is this ideal that some migrants are trying to recreate on 
customary land, and in so doing often resist or reject demands placed on them by local 
landowners for occasional gifts of cash or contributions of labour or food to community 
events.  
 
The demands placed on ‘purchasers’ by customary landowners accord more with the 
common and widespread view of land ownership in PNG which is based on customary law 
(property law for kin relations) and the set of mutual obligations that are required to maintain 
access rights to the land. Furthermore, these rights may be graduated such that a person or 
group has more authority than another in determining land use, or one group may hold rights 
to hunt or plant temporary food gardens, but may not have rights to plant permanent cash 
crops. As in most parts of PNG, customary ownership of land is not based purely on descent, 
but also on co-residence and participation in indigenous exchange (see Cooter, 1991a; 
Larmour, 1991; Curry, 1997). Settlers ‘purchasing’ land are thus expected to act like 
members of the landowning group and follow indigenous rules of kinship and clanship. 
However, it is important to note that this performance of host clan membership is not on an 
equal footing with the host clan or lineage, but is from a subservient position in which the 
wealth and labour power of migrant guest lineages is siphoned to host lineages. 
 
Becoming an insider 
The demands on purchasers by customary landowners could be interpreted as attempts by 
landowners to ‘indigenise’ these land transactions by transforming commodity transactions 
(property law for stranger relations) into indigenous exchange transactions (property law for 
kin relations). In other words, some customary landowners are attempting to socially embed 
these transactions by reinserting the social dimension of indigenous exchange into what are 
considered, at least by some migrants, to be market transactions with strangers. By doing so, 
customary landowners are developing long-term relationships with purchasers (outsiders) 
through incorporating them into networks of obligations and exchange with their host 
community. In the process, they become a subgroup attached to the host group which confers 
on them certain rights and privileges including ongoing access to land. This process we have 
termed ‘property rights for social inclusion’ (Fig. 3). 
 
Those settlers accepting land transactions to be grounded in social relationships (socially 
embedded) and acting in accordance with traditional rules and expectations generally have 
relatively stable relationships with their host communities and ongoing access to land. The 
exchange relationships, in which migrants engage, strengthen their social networks with the 
landowning group and socially integrate them in their host communities. Furthermore, the 
individuals and lineages within the landowning group with whom they have exchange 
relationships become obligated to strengthen these settlers’ identities and positions within the 
broader host group. 
 
Within this framework of property rights for social inclusion, customary landowners’ 
inalienable rights to land are preserved and the outsider becomes an insider with ongoing use 
rights to the land. Thus, what were initially market transactions in land and partly 
disembedded from their social context are now made social and re-embedded through place-
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based practices of non-market exchange which serve to erase identities of difference. This 
type of land ‘purchase’ based on social exchange and inclusion is what underlies land that is 
gifted or informally ‘rented’ to outsiders. Few migrants acquiring land in this way question 




Figure 3. Property rights for social inclusion 
 
 
While these relationships can be enduring, they can sometimes be re-assessed at the death of 
either the clan leader or the migrant involved in the initial land transaction, or at the 
replanting stage when palms are about 20–25 years old. These events are potential rupture 
points in the web of social and generational relationships underpinning resource access 
because established patterns of social and exchange relationships partially dissolve to reform 
as new webs of social relationships. It is at these junctures that the status and value of 
relationships between ‘outsiders’ and their ‘host’ lineages are re-assessed and the land rights 
of outsiders may be renegotiated or even cancelled (see Curry and Koczberski, 2009). While 
the degree of exploitation of the relationships underpinning land access through property 
rights for social inclusion have yet to be determined, it does not appear that economic 
exploitation of migrants by their hosts has become too onerous.12 Many migrants reported 
that the social embedding of these relationships provided them with a sense of belonging in 
the broader host community, even though there was a dependency associated with the 
relationship and host groups retain ultimate authority over the land. 
 
 
Novel but not new 
 
At one level, the ‘sale’ and ‘renting’ of land in WNB can be viewed as a process of 
commodification, but as argued above such land transactions remain, at least from the 
perspective of most customary landowners, anchored in principles of indigenous land tenure 
and longstanding concepts of clan identity, social inclusion and entitlements. 
 
Contemporary land-use agreements between customary landowners and outsiders in WNB 
appear comparable with traditional mechanisms of transferring land rights to individuals and 
Property Rights for Social Inclusion 
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Concept of permanent or temporary use rights 
           
      
      





lineages without birth rights to the land reported operating in other parts of the country 
(Meggitt, 1965, 1971; Reay, 1971; Mandeville, 1979; Mosko, 2005). Anthropologists as early 
as the 1950s observed that while an ideology of descent (primacy of birth rights) was present 
in many PNG societies, social organisation was often sufficiently flexible to accommodate a 
high proportion of outsiders/immigrants (e.g. Barnes, 1967: 40; also Barnes, 1962; Forge, 
1972). Often, immigrants utilised indigenous exchange relationships with host lineages for 
ongoing resource access (Reay, 1959a,b; Glasse, 1968; Forge, 1972; Healey, 1979; 
Mandeville, 1979; Sillitoe, 1979; McDowell, 1980; Curry, 1997). Through participation and 
cooperation in such exchange relationships, outsiders’ membership in land-holding groups 
was facilitated. Thus, while the ‘sale’ of land to migrants for the cultivation of introduced 
cash crops such as oil palm and the informal ‘renting’ of land involve new types of land 
tenure arrangements, they are symbolically and materially modelled on old practices and 
customs that historically may have been widespread in PNG. 
 
The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa, presented earlier, paints a similar picture to the PNG 
situation where new forms of land tenure, based on the ‘rental’ or ‘sale’ of land to outsiders 
are typically modelled on old practices. For example, it was traditionally the case in rural 
areas of West Africa that ‘strangers’ could obtain temporary access to farming land through 
the provisions of customary land tenure that allowed the granting of land to those in need 
(Mathieu et al., 2002: 111). Such access rights were conditional on the maintenance of 
particular relationships and forms of respect and gratitude, expressed as ‘gifts’ that validated 
land rights. As Mathieu and colleagues (2002) explain, access to land by ‘strangers’: 
 
. . . was possible through a personalised, ‘dependent inclusion’ within a space governed by 
the authorities (village chief, land chief) of an indigenous group [Gruenais, 1986]. This 
acknowledgement of the fact that the indigenous group had control of the space implied 
respect of the indigenous authorities and an acceptance of the dependent relationship as 
well as gratitude towards lodgers and sponsors (‘tuteur’ in Côte d’Ivoire, ‘logeur’ in 
Burkina Faso) who took in the migrant and gave him land to cultivate. 
(2002: 111) 
 
Even in the cocoa growing areas of West Africa where sharecropping agreements have 
operated since the colonial period to allow migrants access to land for cocoa farming, there is 
a growing market in land rentals and sales, which Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006: 354) 
view as a ‘logical progression’ flowing from sharecropping agreements. Thus, many of the 
present day land transactions involving the sale and rental of land to migrants in West Africa 
appear to reflect more ‘traditional’ and colonial influenced mechanisms for allocating 
customary land to outsiders (see also Chauveau, 2006; Hagberg, 2006). Furthermore, as noted 
above, while these shifts in land tenure seem to involve evolutionary change towards 
increasing commodification, the process remains to a large extent embedded in social 
relationships (Mathieu et al., 2002: 126; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006) and could be 
viewed as a form of property rights for social inclusion that serve to erase identities of 
difference between customary landowners and ‘outsiders’. 
 
While the land transfers in the Southeast Asian case studies do not appear to represent old 
practices and customs to the same extent as they do in PNG and sub-Saharan Africa, they do 
reveal the ways in which principles of customary land tenure can be manipulated by village 
elite to allow the sale of land. This is also operating in some situations in WNB and West 








This paper has examined the processes by which migrants in the oil palm belt of WNB gain 
access to customary land for export cash cropping and how customary land tenure is being 
modified to accommodate this rising demand for land. Superficially, these land transactions 
appear to involve the commodification of customary land. On closer scrutiny, it is revealed 
that they are often mediated by place-based frameworks of land tenure in which social 
relationships and non-market values play a critical role. These land transactions, which are 
within a framework of property rights for social inclusion, enable migrants to forge a social 
identity as part of the host group that moves them from the position of outsiders to insiders 
and in the process strengthens their access rights to land. Thus, how migrants manage their 
relationships with customary landowners is important for determining their identity, status 
and position in relation to the host group. 
 
There are important implications for policies of land tenure reform arising from the 
malleability of customary land tenure in the context of high rates of immigration, rapid social 
change and expanding commodity production. In the PNG and sub-Saharan African cases, 
emerging forms of land tenure did not require a radical break with traditional regimes of 
customary tenure to accommodate migrants pursuing new types of livelihoods based on cash 
cropping. Traditional tenure regimes are not static and inflexible as often portrayed by 
proponents of land reform who claim land registration and titling will boost agricultural 
productivity. In both PNG and Africa where there is pressure to introduce customary land 
reform policies, the dynamic nature of customary land tenure and its capacity to 
accommodate change is either ignored or downplayed (see edited collection by Fingleton 
(2005b) for a review of these debates in PNG, and Peters (2007) for sub-Saharan Africa). 
 
For proponents on both sides of the debate, there must be a better understanding of what is to 
be gained and lost through policies of land tenure reform. This will require detailed empirical 
analyses of the nature and content of the diverse range of new land tenure regimes that are 
emerging in rural (and urban) areas experiencing high rates of immigration and/or 
agricultural development. These should be described and evaluated carefully before 
embarking on a consideration of the need for land reform policies. Such a process would 
entail, among other things, investigating what a ‘sale’ or land ‘rental’ means for the parties 
making the transaction including the broader community of customary landowners; what it is 
that is being ‘sold’ or ‘rented’; and, the extent to which land is being alienated from 
customary ownership. For example, do ‘sales’ mean complete alienation of land as described 
by Li (2002) and Potter and Badcock (2004) in Sulawesi? Or, does the term mean something 
less than full alienation as in the WNB case study and in some of the African studies 
described above? 
 
The paper also raises several other research questions regarding land transactions between 
migrants and customary landowners. For example, how will land rights, built up by migrants 
over many years through both market and indigenous exchange transactions, be managed or 
regulated by the State, migrants and customary landowner groups, especially given the lack 
of legal status of many land dealings and the emergence of land shortages in some areas? 
How will inheritance, the replanting of senile stands of oil palm and the ‘sub-letting’ of 
‘purchased’ blocks in WNB be managed by customary landowners, the oil palm industry and 
provincial land administrators? And, finally, how can emerging land tenure regimes be kept 
within a framework of property rights for social inclusion that provides some level of tenure 
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1 Almost 97% of land in PNG is held communally under customary tenure with access rights 
based on a mixture of descent, co-residence and participation in communal activities. State 
intervention is limited on customary land. Fingleton’s (2004) description of customary 
land tenure in PNG applies to WNB: ‘a balance between group and individual rights and 
obligations, with land ownership being held at a group level and land use being exercised 
at the individual or household level’ (Fingleton, 2004: 112 quoted in Fingleton 2005a). 
2 We use inverted commas to refer to land ‘sales’, ‘purchases’ and ‘rentals’ where their usage 
in the text does not correspond with their exact meaning in English. 
3 While land sales to migrants are common, the long-term rental of land and accessing land 
through sharecropping is much more widespread among migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In some parts of Africa these mechanisms for accessing land have been operating for more 
than a century (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006). 
4 This should not be interpreted to mean that customary tenure principles are free of 
manipulation by powerful village chiefs or local political leaders in land dealings with 
migrants. 
5 The census data for migrants in the Talasea Census District do not include second or third 
generation migrants born within the District. Thus, the proportion of the rural population 
without birth rights to land is much higher. 
6 Typically, under traditional principles of land tenure, when a food garden is abandoned to 
fallow after several years of cultivation, land tenure reverts to the group. 
7 Lease arrangements in oil palm developments enable customary landowners to enter into 
long-term joint agricultural ventures with private investors through the lease, lease-back 
provisions of the 1996 Land Act (see Koczberski et al., 2001). 
8 Section 81 of the Land Act prohibits the sale of customary land except to citizens of PNG 
in accordance with customary law. According to Cooter (1991b), most magistrates in PNG 
do not believe that customary law allows sales of land to people outside the kinship group. 
9 People buying customary land to establish oil palm in the Hoskins scheme are encouraged 
to follow a set of land sale procedures introduced recently by the extension organisation, 
the Oil Palm Industry Corporation (OPIC) (see Curry et al., 2007 for details). 
10 In many rural areas of PNG, health and education services and road infrastructure have 
deteriorated, and there are few employment opportunities. 
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11 The state land is ‘rented’ to migrants by the original customary landowners. 
12 For a description of a PNG case study in which these relationships have become highly 
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